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LEADING TOWARDS A LEVEL
PLAYING FIELD, REPAYING





This article considers a number of different ways
of conceptualizing the relationship between South and
North in the environmental context, focusing on
international responses to climate change and, in
particular, the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change. It explores
three stories about international environmental
cooperation. One derives from the concept of “ecological
debt,” the second comes from the concept of
“environmental space,” and the third, which might be
said to underlie the U.S. approach to the Kyoto Protocol
at the present time, is labelled “leading towards a level
playing field.” The article provides an overview of all
three stories, and attempts to offer some insight into the
very different visions of the international community that
they encapsulate.
Cet article réfléchit à un certain nombre de
manières de conceptualiser la relation entre le Nord et
le Sud dans le contexte environnemental, s'intéresse aux
réactions internationales au changement climatique et,
en particulier, au Protocole de Kyoto à la
Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les
changements climatiques. L'article approfondit trois
histoires relatives à la coopération environnementale
internationale. L'une découle du concept de « dette
écologique », la deuxième provient du concept « d'espace
environnemental » et la troisième, dont on peut dire
qu'elle sous-tend la démarche américaine actuelle envers
le Protocole de Kyoto, est jugée « mener vers un terrain
équilibré ». L'article donne un aperçu des trois histoires
et tente d'éclaircir quelque peu des perceptions
fondamentalement différentes de la communauté
internationale qu'elles résument.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Much of the literature on international law post-September 11
(“9/11”) has focused on the areas that have been impacted dramatically,
such as security, the use of force, terrorism, and human rights. Little
attention has been paid to areas that have been impacted in less obvious
ways. International environmental law is one such area. One need not be
a partisan of the school of thought that espouses “environmental security”
as a new basis for international cooperation to recognize that there are
strong currents swirling around the field of international environmental
law, the implications of which have barely begun to be explored. In
particular, these recent developments could have a significant effect on the
relationship between South and North with regard to environmental
matters. That relationship has been the subject of debate for more than
thirty years. But as the need for international cooperation on
environmental issues of global concern has become more obvious, the need
for South-North understanding has come to be seen as increasingly critical.
The editors of this special issue posed a challenge, asking us to
consider whether it is possible to “envision and articulate alternative …
more globally valid, stories about international law, global institutions and
international practices.” I have decided to take up this challenge quite
literally, by focussing on the idea of stories. The purpose of this article,
then, is to consider some of the very different ways in which we might tell
the story of international environmental law and the relationship between
South and North at the present historical juncture. To that end, three
stories will be presented. The first story appears to underlie the approach
taken by the United States at the present time. I call it “leading towards a
level playing field” because it combines an insistence on all nations
shouldering a fair share of the burdens associated with global
environmental protection, with an acceptance of a narrow sense of
leadership that regards developed countries as taking a lead role because
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of their technological capacity and expertise. This approach predates 9/11,
but there are clear indications that it is becoming more entrenched, and
increasingly linked with notions of national self-interest that view the
interests of the international community as secondary at best, irrelevant at
worst. The second story comes from the concept of “ecological debt,” first
proposed in the early 1990s by Latin American activists who argued that the
North is indebted to the South for the enormous costs of environmental
degradation that has resulted from its process of industrial and economic
development. The final story comes from the concept of “environmental
space,” which posits that given the limitations of both resources for
extraction and assimilative capacity for the byproducts of industrialization,
the North needs to “make room” for the nations of the South to pursue
economic and social development. This article provides an overview of all
three stories, and attempts to offer some insight into the very different
visions of the international community that they encapsulate.
The lens through which this article examines these three stories is
that of the international responses to the problem of climate change and,
in particular, the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Kyoto Protocol represents
the culmination of the most ambitious, sophisticated and complex
experiment in international environmental law making that has ever been
attempted. It also represents an attempt on the part of the international
community to respond to perhaps the most daunting environmental
challenge it has ever faced. Unlike other issues tackled in the past, the
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions linked to climate change come from all
parts of the world and result from a wide range of activities, from
agriculture to industry. In particular, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions have
practically been the measure of economic activity since the time of the
Industrial Revolution. It is not much of an exaggeration to say that the
economy of the modern industrialized state has been a carbon economy.
The Kyoto Protocol also represents the expectation and hope of the
international community that the developed countries will take a leadership
role in meeting the challenges of climate change. While Canada, the
nations of the European Union, Japan, the Russian Federation, and others
have accepted that role, the United States has made it clear that it will not,
citing the lack of obligations on developing countries as a major concern.
It is not alone; Australia has also decided not to ratify the protocol. But the
United States stand is particularly controversial—not only because the
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United States remains the single largest emitter of CO2 in the world,
1 but
also because to many observers it reflects the disdain for multilateralism
that appears to characterize so many aspects of U.S. foreign policy at the
present time.
The structure of the article is as follows. Part II traces the U.S.
approach. It begins by providing some background to the U.S. stance on
global environmental matters, before turning to an examination of the U.S.
stance on the Kyoto Protocol from its origins to the present time. It then
analyzes the story of “leading towards a level playing field.” Part III deals
with ecological debt, beginning with an examination of the origins and
evolution of the concept, proceeding to describe its content, and discussing
its application to the problem of climate change before analyzing the story
of “repaying ecological debt.” Part IV, dealing with environmental space,
follows a structure similar to that of Part III. Part V will compare these
different stories, and consider how they overlap and diverge. It will also
explore the implications of each as a foundation for international
environmental law. The article concludes by asking how we might
conceptualize South-North cooperation on environmental matters in a way
that does not perpetuate an international system that is fundamentally
unequal and inequitable. 
II. LEADING TOWARDS A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
A. The U.S. Stance on Global Environmental Matters
The U.S. approach towards environmental challenges can be
characterized as somewhat schizoid, with its stance differing dramatically
between the domestic and the international sphere. Domestically, the
United States was one of the first nations to develop a rigorous set of
environmental laws in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In the midst of the
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED), the Office of the President issued a publication which asserted
that the United States had “long been the world’s leader in environmental
preservation, with the world’s most comprehensive and advanced programs
for controlling pollution, protecting valuable public lands, and enforcing
environmental laws.”2 While one might take issue with the hyperbole, there
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is no doubt that the United States has a well-developed and comprehensive
body of environmental legislation.
Internationally, on the other hand, the United States has come to
be widely regarded as a major obstacle to the evolution of effective
environmental regimes. This was not always the case, as can be seen by U.S.
involvement in international action in relation to ozone depletion. The
United States took a clear leadership role in the development of a rigorous
set of obligations in the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer; in fact, in marked contrast to what has occurred with respect
to climate change, it was certain European nations who had to be coaxed
and pushed into undertaking significant commitments to phase out the
production of ozone-depleting substances. What is even more noteworthy
is that during this time, the United States seemed to be quite comfortable
with the notion of differentiated obligations for developing countries. It
expressed few qualms about the inclusion of a grace period whereby
developing countries would be allowed a longer time frame within which to
meet their phase-out commitments. The U.S. chief negotiator, Richard
Benedick, writing later about the negotiations, stated, “[t]he designers of
the protocol had assumed that developing countries’ consumption of
[ozone depleting substances] would, starting from an extremely low base,
need to expand to meet legitimate needs of their growing economies.”3
Nevertheless, even in the ozone context, there were indications that
the United States had no intention of allowing its leadership role to be
interpreted expansively. It resisted the establishment of the Multilateral
Fund, which was set up in order to facilitate developing country
participation in the Protocol through the provision of financial resources
to cover the incremental costs of phasing out ozone-depleting substances.
When it finally became clear that the establishment of the Fund was a
precondition to the ratification of the Protocol by such key players as India
and China, the United States capitulated, although its representatives
emphasized that this was “without prejudice to any future arrangements
that may be developed with respect to other environmental issues.”4
It was this stance vis-à-vis the Fund, rather than the early
acceptance of differentiated phase-out commitments, that proved to be
typical of the U.S. approach to other environmental matters. For example,
in the negotiating process leading up to the UNCED treaties (the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and UNFCCC, for example), the
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United States was widely perceived as playing an obstructionist role. With
the former, the United States expressed grave concerns regarding the
potential erosion of intellectual property rights represented by provisions
requiring that the benefits arising from the commercial exploitation of
biological diversity be shared equitably between the commercial enterprises
involved, on the one hand, and host states and local communities on the
other.5 In the climate change context, the original hope had been that the
UNFCCC would include binding emissions reduction commitments for
developed country parties. The United States successfully resisted this
initiative, threatening to refuse to ratify. U.S. involvement was seen as
critical, and therefore the UNFCCC simply requires states to develop
national policies “with the aim of returning individually or jointly” to 1990
levels of greenhouse gas emissions.6 The United States was also unwilling
to accept the imposition of common response measures such as carbon
taxes or energy efficiency standards (“policies and measures”); thus, the
UNFCCC leaves the choice of policies to individual parties. The approach
taken by the United States to both these treaties proved to be a major
source of controversy during the process leading up to UNCED and at the
Conference itself. The United States attempted to prove its environmental
credentials by proposing a treaty on forests, but this initiative was not
successful.7 President George Bush, in particular, was widely excoriated for
his perceived intransigence on global environmental matters. United States
Representative George Miller, a member of the Congressional delegation
to the Conference, noted that he was “struck by the palpable resentment
towards our country both from the developed nations and the developing
world.”8
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B. The U.S. Stance on the Kyoto Protocol
It is with regard to the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, however, that
the U.S. stance on global environmental matters has been most visible, and
most controversial, in recent years. The Kyoto Protocol was essentially a
response to the failure to achieve binding emissions reduction
commitments in the UNFCCC, and was seen as the logical extension of the
stabilization target. Work on a protocol began almost immediately after the
Convention’s entry into force.9 The first Conference of the Parties to the
UNFCCC (COP-1), held in Berlin in April 1995, asserting that the
commitments for developed country parties were inadequate, decided to
undertake a new set of negotiations on a “protocol or other legal
instrument.” The decision, known as the “Berlin Mandate,”10 set out the
parameters for the negotiations, and emphasized that the new instrument
would “[n]ot introduce any new commitments” for developing countries,
although it would “reaffirm existing commitments … and continue to
advance the implementation of these commitments in order to achieve
sustainable development.”11 The United States accepted the Mandate
despite considerable domestic opposition.
The Berlin Mandate established an ad hoc group to coordinate the
negotiation process. While the Berlin Mandate clearly excluded new
commitments for developing countries, the United States nevertheless
brought this issue up on an ongoing basis.12 It also began to take a different
approach to the question of how to approach developed country
commitments. At COP-2, the United States argued that the most cost-
effective way of dealing with climate change was with targets; in particular,
it began to champion the inclusion of emissions trading, which was greeted
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with little enthusiasm by the Europeans and the Group of Seventy-seven
(G-77).13 
On the domestic front, the U.S. Senate made its own views known.
In June 1997, Senator Robert Byrd, a Democrat from West Virginia, and
Senator Chuck Hagel, a Republican from Nebraska, sponsored a resolution
“[e]xpressing the sense of the Senate regarding the conditions for the
United States becoming a signatory to any international agreement on GHG
emissions under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change.”14 This “Byrd-Hagel Resolution,” noting the rapid increase of GHG
emissions by Developing Country Parties, asserted that “the exemption for
Developing Country Parties is inconsistent with the need for global action
on climate change and is environmentally flawed,” and expressed the strong
belief of the Senate “that the proposals under negotiation, because of the
disparity of treatment between Annex I Parties and Developing Countries
and the level of required emission reductions, could result in serious harm
to the United States economy.” It went on to convey the sense of the
Senate that the United States should not be a signatory to any agreement
that would: 
(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the
[developed country parties], unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new
specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing
Country Parties within the same compliance period, or
(B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States ... .
The Senate passed the resolution by a vote of 95 to 0. In a speech
to Congress a few months later, Senator Hagel stated,
Many of my colleagues and I fear that the current treaty negotiations will shackle the United
States economy, meaning fewer jobs, lower economic growth and a lower standard of living
for our children and our future generations. This treaty would do so without any meaningful
reduction in greenhouse gases because it leaves out the very nations who will be the world’s
largest emitters of greenhouse gases, the more than 130 developing nations including China,
India, Mexico, South Korea and many others.15
Thus, the U.S. delegation went into COP-3, held in Kyoto in 1997,
knowing that the prospects for Senate ratification of the Protocol within the
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parameters of the Berlin Mandate were slim. There was considerable
uncertainty as to whether the United States would even sign the Kyoto
Protocol. Vice President Gore, well-known for his strong environmental
convictions, led the U.S. delegation and expressed the commitment of
President Clinton to sign the Protocol. Nevertheless, in a statement made
when the United States did sign the Protocol in November 1998, Gore
asserted,
Signing the Protocol, while an important step forward, imposes no obligations on the United
States. The Protocol becomes binding only with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate.
As we have said before, we will not submit the Protocol for ratification without the
meaningful participation of key developing countries in efforts to address climate change.16
Gore went on to include support for the Protocol as part of his
platform during the 2000 presidential election campaign, expressing pride
in the accomplishment that the Protocol represented, and characterizing it
as “an indispensable first step” in the battle to address climate change.17
George W. Bush, on the other hand, harshly criticized the Protocol
during the 2000 campaign,18 and wasted little time in communicating those
views to the international community after assuming office. In March 2001,
when asked whether the U.S. would pull out from the Kyoto Protocol, Press
Secretary Ari Fleischer expressed the President’s opposition to the
Protocol, while emphasizing that “there’s nothing to withdraw from because
there is no treaty in effect.”19 In a letter sent earlier that month to Senators
Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts, President Bush stated, “I oppose the
Kyoto Protocol because it exempts 80 percent of the world, including major
population centers such as China and India, from compliance, and would
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cause serious harm to the U.S. economy.”20 Recalling the Byrd-Hagel
Resolution, Bush noted that the 95-0 vote reflected “a clear consensus that
the Kyoto Protocol is an unfair and ineffective means of addressing global
climate change concerns.”21 Insisting that his administration “takes the
issue of global climate change very seriously,” Bush stated, “we will
continue to fully examine global climate change issues—including the
science, technologies, market-based systems, and innovative options for
addressing concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere.”22
The Bush position on the Kyoto Protocol raised a firestorm of
criticism. On the diplomatic front, the Europeans and Japanese expressed
grave concerns about the U.S. Administration’s position.23 Non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) were more blunt. The New Delhi-based
Centre for Science and Environment proclaimed,
At a time when a large part of India’s population does not even have access to electricity,
Bush would like this country to stem its “survival emissions”, so that industrialised countries
like the US can continue to have high “luxury emissions”. This amounts to demanding a
freeze on global inequity, where rich countries stay rich, and poor countries stay poor, since
carbon dioxide emissions are closely linked to GDP growth.24
United States NGOs were no less scathing in condemning their
government’s stance. The Natural Resources Defence Council asserted:
Singling out China and India, as the president has done, demonstrates the inequity in his
claim of unfairness. Nearly half the population of India lives on less than $1 per day; the
death rate of Indian children under 5 years is 13 times higher than in the United States; the
average person in India uses less electricity in a year than the average American uses every
two weeks. Given that developed countries have put 75 percent of accumulated greenhouse
pollution in the atmosphere and the disparity in living conditions between the United States
and such countries as China and India, it is morally bankrupt to argue that the United States
should refuse to take additional action until the world’s poor countries take the same
action.25
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There are some signs of change. One commentator characterizes
U.S. environmental discourse as “undergoing seismic shifts of opinion” with
regard to climate change, with opinion polls indicating that 70 to 80 per
cent of Americans take the problem seriously and “want their country to
take the lead in addressing it.”26 Nevertheless, there still appears to be
considerable reticence towards the Kyoto Protocol, which is not limited to
the Bush Administration or the Republican Party. During the 2004
presidential campaign, for example, John Kerry was critical of President
Bush’s stance on climate change, but stopped short of embracing the
Protocol. Instead, he pledged to “reengage in the development of
international climate change strategy that will address the worldwide
problem of global warming and identify workable responses that provide
opportunities for American technology and know-how.”27 In fact, a
document produced by the Kerry-Edwards campaign touching on the
Protocol was quite consistent with what has been said about climate change
by the Bush Administration, despite attempting to differentiate itself:
Using American ingenuity to level the playing field
John Kerry and John Edwards believe that the Kyoto Protocol is not the answer. The near-
term emission reductions it would require of the United States are infeasible, while the long-
term obligations imposed on all nations are too little to solve the problem. Unlike the current
Administration, John Kerry and John Edwards will offer an alternative to the Kyoto process
that leads the world toward a more equitable and effective answer ... .28
While asserting that under a Kerry-Edwards Administration the
United States would “equitably match the initial efforts of [its] industrial-
country trading partners and competitors,” the document emphasized that
the time frame for U.S. emissions reductions has to be “reasonable and
realistic,” and that “American workers and industries should not be forced
to shoulder the costs of these reductions.”29 The emphasis throughout was
on the deployment of innovative (American) technology in order to meet
emissions reduction targets, and on cost-effectiveness of measures adopted.
Finally, the statement emphasized that the alternative to the Kyoto
Protocol must involve a commitment on the part of “key developing
countries” to “reduce the growth of their greenhouse gas emissions.”30
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C. The Story of Leading Towards a Level Playing Field
While there seems to be no doubt that concerns about harm to the
economy have largely driven the U.S. stance on the Kyoto Protocol, the so-
called exemption of the developing world from emissions reduction
commitments has clearly been a critical factor. This is particularly apparent
in how the U.S. stance is justified. Harm to the economy, after all, while a
fundamental concern of the electorate, does not have the same emotional
resonance as an appeal to fundamental notions of fairness. The U.S.
administration appears to be counting on its insistence on fairness to
legitimate and soften its stance with regard to economic concerns. From a
strategic point of view, it is a brilliant tactic. Rather than simply telling the
American people that it is their right to continue living one of the most
energy-intensive lifestyles on earth, the U.S. administration tells them that
the rest of the international community expects them to carry more than
their fair share. After all, who wants to shoulder an “unfair” part of any
burden?
While it is all too easy to satirize this position, it is important to
resist the temptation to overstate it. Paul Harris argues that it is simply not
accurate (nor is it particularly fair) to characterize the U.S. position on the
Kyoto Protocol as reflecting a lack of understanding of the differences
between developed and developing states.31 Far from reflecting a
repudiation of the principle of “common but differentiated
responsibilities,” Harris asserts, the Byrd-Hagel Resolution represents “an
alternative interpretation of it, albeit a less robust one than the developing
countries wanted.”32 He points out that the debate in the U.S. Senate
reflected an awareness and acceptance of the notion of differentiated
obligations. The participants did not envisage emissions reduction
commitments for developing countries; instead, they sought a commitment
to limit emissions increases. Rather than pursuing the traditional economic
model of carbon-intensive economic growth, the developing countries
should undertake to pursue an alternative development path, which would
impose less of a burden on the environment. Furthermore, the senators did
not expect an acceptance of obligations by all developing countries; there
appeared to be consensus that the burden should fall on those countries
which had both significant CO2 emissions, on the one hand, and the
resources to pursue alternatives, on the other. The least developed
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countries were seen as falling outside the scope of the Resolution.33
Even if one takes into account Harris’s warning regarding the
debates surrounding Byrd-Hagel, some troubling concerns remain. It is
striking that in a debate full of references to the need to pursue an
alternative development path, very little is said about the need for the
United States to wean itself from its own carbon habit. The Kerry-Edwards
statement on the Kyoto Protocol reproduced above is much the same; in
fact, it appeared in “The Kerry-Edwards Plan for Clean Coal,” a document
that targeted at voters in West Virginia and other coal-producing states.34
The Plan emphasized that coal is “vital to our nation’s energy and economic
security,” and asserted that “the environmental issues sometimes thought
to be impediments to the expanded use of coal can be solved with new clean
coal technologies.”35
Similarly, while the responsibility of developing countries to start
doing their part to address climate change is an important theme, and there
is some acknowledgment that they may need assistance in order to do so,
there is no discussion of how that assistance is to be provided. In particular,
the responsibility of developed countries to provide assistance either
through the provision of financial resources or through technology transfer
is not acknowledged. Setting aside the least developed countries, there is
no sense that the larger developing countries have anything other than a
lack of political will standing in the way of doing something to limit
greenhouse gas emission increases. The Kerry-Edwards Plan stated,
“China, India, and the other key developing countries must also join the
effort by agreeing to reduce the growth of their greenhouse gas
emissions—a step that can be achieved by the installation of American-made
energy technologies.”36 But nothing is said about how that installation is to
take place; it is not implausible to assume that what is being contemplated
is a straightforward market transaction.
So what is the story that all of this tells about international
environmental law, and about the Kyoto Protocol? The ultimate goal
appears to be an international system made up of nations much like the
United States itself: economically developed, technologically advanced,
competing on an open market. There is an acknowledgment that the
developed countries need to show leadership, and that the United States,
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in particular, has a key role to play. However, this leadership is
conceptualized in very different terms from the leadership contemplated
in the climate change regime, which recognizes the importance of having
resources and technology, but also emphasizes a willingness to take
responsibility for a problem that was primarily created by the developed
countries. The Kerry-Edwards plan expressed confidence that “with
technology leadership from U.S. industry and policy leadership from the
U.S. government, America can once again guide the world to a more secure
future.”37 Perhaps the acknowledgment of leadership is enough; perhaps
one ought not to expect an acknowledgment of responsibility. But as the
next two stories show, there are ways of thinking about international
environmental law that appear to offer a different foundation for
international cooperation.
III. REPAYING ECOLOGICAL DEBT 
A. The Origins and Evolution of the Concept of Ecological Debt
The concept of ecological debt is usually attributed to the work of
Latin American authors from the early 1990s.38 In 1990, the Instituto de
Ecologia Política, based in Santiago, Chile, published “Ecological Debt: A
Sociopolitical Perspective.”39 The focus of the paper was on ozone
depletion, an obvious concern to Chile due to its geographical location. The
authors argued that the costs associated with ozone depletion should be
borne by those who had produced and benefited from ozone-depleting
substances. The theme was taken up by a Colombian lawyer, José Borrero
Navia, who published a study of the concept in 1994.40 
The idea of ecological debt was brought forward to the Earth
Summit in 1992 by Latin American NGOs. A document entitled “External
Debt and Ecological Debt,” signed by twenty-one NGO representatives from
eight Latin American nations, “proposed that external debt be swapped for
the region’s ecological and social losses derived from colonialism and past
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exploitative foreign investment.”41 While this plea appears to have had little
impact on the governmental representatives attending the conference,42 the
NGO Forum was more receptive. One of the “Alternative Treaties”
produced by the Forum was a Debt Treaty, the preamble of which
recognizes “the existence of a planetary ecological debt of the North,”
defining it as being “essentially constituted by economic and trade relations
based on the indiscriminate exploitation of resources, and its ecological
impacts … including global environmental deterioration, most of which is
the responsibility of the North.”43 The Treaty goes on to pledge that the
participants will “[w]ork for the recognition and compensation of the
planetary ecological debt of the North with respect to the South.”44
While NGO activism on ecological debt continued throughout the
1990s, the concept appears to have gained a wider audience in recent years
through being embraced by organizations involved in campaigns for
external debt forgiveness, based in both the North and the South.45 Friends
of the Earth (FoE) International began an ongoing campaign on ecological
debt in 1999.46 The first World Social Forum, held in Porto Alegre, Brazil
in 2001, proclaimed:
The external debt of the countries of the South has been repaid several times over.
Illegitimate, unjust and fraudulent, it functions as an instrument of domination, depriving
people of their fundamental human rights with the sole aim of increasing international usury.
152 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 43, NO. 1 & 2
47
 “Porto Alegre Appeal for Mobilisation,” online: <http://www.focusweb.org/publications/
2001/Porto%20Alegre/POA%20declaracion%20-%20mov%20soc%20-%20ingles.htm>.
48
 Online: Deuda Ecologica <http://www.deudaecologica.org/>.
49
 Online: ENRED - European Network for the Recognition of the Ecological Debt
<http://www.enredeurope.org/principal.htm>.
50
 “Declaration of the South Summit”, online: G-77 <http://www.g77.org/main/
docs/summitfinaldocs_english.pdf > at 12 [emphasis added].
51
 Daniel Mittler of FOEI notes “FOEI has thus far not succeeded in making ecological debt an
official Summit topic, although we will continue our efforts in the run-up to Johannesburg. We did
however get the topic on government radar screens at the second PrepCom. India, for example, took
up ecological debt in the plenary and acknowledged they did so due to our campaigning. There was also
considerable press interest in the issue.” Daniel Mittler, “Right Topics, Wrong Answers: Trade Agenda
and Greenwash to Smother Johannesburg Summit?” online: Friends of the Earth International
<http://www.foei.org/wssd/greenwash.html>.
52
 Wolfgang Sachs, ed., The Jo’burg Memo: Fairness in a Fragile World, Memorandum for the World
Summit  on  Sus ta inable  Deve lopment ,  on l ine :  Heinr ich  Böl l  Foundat ion
<http://www.worldsummit2002.org/ publications/memo_en_with.pdf>. 
53
 “North Owes South Huge Ecological Debt”, online: World Council of Churches
<http://www.wcc-coe.org/wcc/what/jpc/north-owes.pdf>.
54
 “Nordic NGOs Viewpoints and Suggestions”, online: 92-gruppen <http://www.92grp.dk/
politik/demener/Baeredygtig%20udvikling/norduk.htm>.
We demand its unconditional cancellation and the reparation of historical, social, and
ecological debts, as immediate steps toward a definitive resolution of the crisis this Debt
provokes.47 
Since that time, NGO networks have been formed to work on this
issue both in the South (the Southern Peoples’ Ecological Debt Creditor
Alliance, SPEDCA)48 and in the North (the European Network for the
Recognition of Ecological Debt, ENRED).49
While very visible within the NGO community, there have been few
references to the concept of ecological debt at an intergovernmental level.
The South Summit, a meeting of Heads of State of the G-77 held in
Havana, Cuba in 2000, advocated “a solution for the serious global,
regional and local environmental problems facing humanity, based on the
recognition of the North’s ecological debt, and the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities of the developed and developing countries.”50
However, there was no attempt to explain this reference or what it entailed.
FoE unsuccessfully tried to have ecological debt included as a topic at the
2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD).51 Despite the
lack of official recognition, the concept was brought forward at the WSSD
by various NGOs and NGO coalitions in addition to FoE, including the
Heinrich Böll Foundation,52 the World Council of Churches,53 and the
Nordic NGOs.54 It continues to have resonance in civil society, and there
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appears to be growing academic interest, as evidenced by a number of
conferences held in recent years exploring the concept and its potential
applicability to both domestic and international environmental policy.55 
B. The Concept of Ecological Debt
The conceptual origins of ecological debt are closely connected with
external debt. It is not a coincidence that the concept originates in Latin
America; since the time of independence from Spain, Portugal, and other
colonial powers, indebtedness to foreign entities has plagued the Latin
American nations.56 More recently, the so-called debt crisis of the late
1970s and early 1980s left the region experiencing significant political and
economic turmoil, as governments attempted to meet payments that ate up
an ever increasing proportion of foreign exchange earnings. This
phenomenon was experienced all over the developing world; it is estimated
that debt service of all the developing countries increased from 13.3 per
cent of exports of goods and services in 1970 to 20.4 per cent in 1990.57 The
sheer magnitude of the problem gave rise to widespread attempts to come
to terms with its moral and historical dimensions, in addition to its
economic and political impacts.58 Far from being an academic exercise, the
development of the concept of ecological debt represented a response to
a situation that was experienced as oppressive and unjust. It attempts to
turn the whole notion of “indebtedness” on its head. Instead of the nations
of the North being seen as creditors, ecological debt assumes they ought to
be seen as owing an enormous amount to the peoples of the South, who
have borne many of the costs of environmentally unsustainable
development but have reaped few of its benefits.
History plays a key role in the concept of ecological debt. It
emphasizes that present-day environmental problems do not arise in a
vacuum; they are often the result of a long, often slow, and cumulative
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process. Responsibility for addressing those problems, according to this
view, cannot be assigned based on present activities; it requires an
identification of those involved all the way along the process. The argument
is particularly persuasive with regard to global problems such as ozone
depletion and climate change, but has also been applied to issues ranging
from the transport of hazardous wastes to biopiracy.
Despite the importance of history, however, the concept does not
assume that responsibility hinges only on the earlier imbalances with regard
to resource utilization and appropriation of ecological carrying capacity.
Instead, ecological debt traces many of the benefits presently enjoyed by
the North to its longstanding ability to draw upon global resources. The
moral responsibility with regard to ecological debt, in other words, does not
derive from visiting the “sins of the fathers” upon present generations in
the North. Instead, it arises from an acknowledgment that the privileged
position of the developed countries represents the culmination, and in
many cases the perpetuation, of a history of unequal access.
At first glance, the notion of ecological debt may appear to be
deeply anthropocentric; the talk of resources and appropriation seems to
assume that the only limitations on human exploitation of nature are the
rights and interests of other humans. This is not the case. Joan Martinez-
Alier, the best known academic commentator on the concept, has pointed
out that there is an ecological debt owed to future generations and to other
species.59 While frequently mentioned, this variety of ecological debt has
clearly not been given priority. The emphasis on the rights of the peoples
of the South is understandable given the origins of the concept, but it is also
consistent with approaches to environmental ethics that highlight the
human and social dimensions of environmental problems, such as social
ecology, environmental justice, and eco-feminism.
C. Ecological Debt and Climate Change
Climate change is well-suited to an ecological debt analysis, for a
number of reasons. First, there is little doubt that current GHG
concentrations in the atmosphere are the result of a long process, going
back at least two hundred years. Second, there is a clear difference in
historical emissions of GHGs on the part of developed and developing
countries. According to one study, between 1800 and 1990 the developed
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countries accounted for over 84 per cent of all carbon dioxide emissions
caused by fossil-fuel burning, and over 75 per cent of the carbon dioxide
emissions associated with deforestation.60 The timing is not coincidental;
there are clear indications that GHG concentrations began to increase
steadily as the process of industrialization gained momentum. Finally,
climate change is an area in which there appears to have been a political
willingness to acknowledge this imbalance, as reflected in the preamble to
the UNFCCC, which notes
that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has
originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions in developing countries are still
relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will
grow to meet their social and development needs.61 
For all these reasons, but perhaps most importantly because of its
visibility as the single most pressing environmental challenge currently
facing the international community, climate change has been one of the
most frequently cited applications of the ecological debt concept, and has
in fact given rise to a specialized term, the “carbon debt.”62
In themselves, the historical reality of unequal contributions to GHG
concentrations, and even its political acknowledgment, are of limited value
in determining climate change policy. In the interstate context, they are
central to the notion of “common but differentiated responsibilities,” but
have had few implications apart from insulating developing countries from
mandatory emissions reduction commitments. For those demanding a
recognition of the carbon debt, on the other hand, the implications are
monumental. At a practical level, debt requires payment. An obvious
difficulty arises in calculating what that payment would involve. At least two
possibilities have been identified.63 The first is that the carbon debt should
be quantified in terms of “damage costs,” in other words, the costs
associated with future losses due to climate change. The second would
quantify “abatement costs,” the costs associated with reducing current
emissions to levels consistent with the scientific estimates of what is
required to avoid interference with the global climate. In either case, the
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sums involved are enormous. One study estimated that “a total annual
subsidy of US$75 billion is forthcoming from south to north.”64 
However, many proponents of the notion of a carbon debt do not
regard monetary damages as being their top priority. In part, this stems
from an acknowledgment of the technical difficulties involved in
quantification, and of the political resistance such a proposal would likely
encounter. Furthermore, there appears to be some reluctance to calculate
the value of nature, perhaps because many regard such calculations as
representing a perpetuation of the ways of thinking that have led to the
current environmental crisis. Most importantly, however, there is a sense
that the enormity of the costs associated with environmental damage are
invoked precisely because they cannot be met; the assumption seems to be
that presenting the North with a potentially enormous bill might actually
get them to pull back from the table. As Martinez- Alier puts it, “The claim
of the ecological debt, when it becomes an important topic on the
international political agenda … will contribute to the ‘ecological
adjustment’ which the North must make.”65
D. The Story of Repaying Ecological Debt
The story told by the proponents of ecological debt regarding the
past, present, and future of international environmental law seems to be
poles apart from the story of a level playing field. Yet ecological debt, too,
seeks a level playing field, but with a twist: it insists that the field can only
be level after accounting for the benefits that some have enjoyed, and the
burdens that others have borne. Ecological debt demands an
acknowledgment of connections; of the fact that privilege and poverty are
not disconnected phenomena. Furthermore, there is more than fairness at
stake, important though it is. It should come as no surprise that many of the
organizations concerned with ecological debt, and debt relief more
generally, are faith-based, for what is demanded is not just a sense of
responsibility but a sense of solidarity. It might be precisely this invocation
of something beyond mere fairness that makes ecological debt proponents
vulnerable to accusations of naïveté, and makes their demand for
reparation run the risk of melding with countless other demands for
recognition and response to historical injustices. However, there appear to
have been attempts to remedy this problem by thinking about
“compensation” in non-traditional ways, and by linking the concept to other




There is no doubt that debt forgiveness is regarded as the first step
in repaying the ecological debt. Despite the idealism inherent in these
proposals, the proponents of ecological debt recognize that even if the
developed world were to acknowledge the extent to which it has benefited
from activities that have harmed the environment and peoples of the
developing world, and therefore recognized its responsibility to address the
situation, this could not be done completely or even primarily through
financial compensation. However, what appears to be regarded as
absolutely essential is a shift in current patterns of resource flows from
South to North. This could begin with forgiveness of significant portions of
the external debt of the countries least able to afford their payments, but
would presumably then extend to a more comprehensive elimination of
oppressive external debt loads.
Beyond this, the proponents of ecological debt draw on work done
by others on what is required to bring about a more equitable and
sustainable allocation of global resources. One approach is a process
labeled “contraction and convergence.”66 On the one hand, the North
would have to undertake changes to reduce its environmental impacts; on
the other, the South would undertake a development path that would
enable it to meet the aspirations of its peoples. In the climate change
context, this would require a substantial decrease in GHG emissions in the
North, while those emissions would increase in the South. The ultimate
outcome is not intended to reflect absolute parity in the worldwide
emissions; there is a recognition that emissions might vary according to
climate and other conditions (for example, in colder climates, emissions
related to heating are likely to be significantly higher regardless of
technological advances in fuel efficiency and insulation).
The contrast between the bold demand for debt forgiveness and the
soft-spoken follow-up regarding sustainability may appear somewhat
incongruous. What must be kept in mind, however, is that the ultimate goal
appears to be an international community based on solidarity rather than
on competition. The language of debtors and creditors is invoked, at least
in part, in order to disrupt the received wisdom of who occupies those roles.
The enormity of costs is intended to drive home the point that some forms
of damage cannot be quantified by conventional means. By speaking a
language that the mainstream is able to understand, in other words, there
appears to be a hope that the need to go beyond that language will become
clear.
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IV. MAKING ENVIRONMENTAL SPACE
A. The Origins and Concept of Environmental Space
[A] fair distribution of environmental space use safeguards the social cohesion of our
societies, their caring capacity, which is just as important to sustainable development as the
carrying capacity of our ecosystems.67
Unlike ecological debt, the concept of environmental space
originated in the academy. J.B. Opschoor, presently at the Free University
of Amsterdam, is generally credited with introducing the term in 1987,
albeit first in a somewhat expanded version (“environmental utilisation
space”). The concept was adopted by FoE Netherlands in preparing the
Action Plan for a Sustainable Netherlands, first published in 1990; the
English translation was published in 1993 and gave the concept a wider
international audience.68 In 1994, FoE Europe, in cooperation with the
Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment, Energy, prepared a report
entitled Towards Sustainable Europe,69 applying the concept on a
continental basis. In the late 1990s two studies were published which
attempted to develop a broader set of principles: Sharing the World:
Sustainable Living & Global Equity in the 21st Century,70 and Greening the
North: A Post-Industrial Blueprint for Ecology and Equity.71 
The two underpinnings of the concept of environmental space, as
it has developed over the past fifteen years, are ecological limits and equity.
The early academic analysis focussed on the former; the premise was that
environmental space “reflects the fact that at any given point in time, there
are limits to the amount of environmental pressure that the Earth’s
ecosystems can handle without irreversible damage to these systems or to
the life support processes that they enable.”72 Despite a recognition that the
notion of limits also required a consideration of how environmental space
is to be allocated, the concept itself, as used in the early academic literature,
2005] Leading Towards a Level Playing Field 159
73
 Supra note 70 at 9.
74
 Donella H. Meadows et al., The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the
Predicament of Mankind (New York: Universe Books, 1972) [Limits to Growth].
75
 Supra note 72 at 9. Similarly, Carley & Spapens note that Limits to Growth emphasized the
limits of the resources available for consumption, while environmental space emphasizes the limits to
the capacity of ecosystems to absorb the environmental impacts of resource exploitation. Sharing the
World, supra note 70 at 60.
did not incorporate a distributional element. In contrast, Sustainable
Netherlands and Sustainable Europe redefined environmental space so as to
include equity as an integral component. Sharing the World uses the
following definition:
Environmental space is the total amount of energy, non-renewable resources, land, water,
wood and other resources which can be used globally or regionally:
! without environmental damage
! without impinging on the rights of future generations; and
! within the context of equal rights to resource consumption and concern for the quality of
life for all peoples in the world.73
Commentators have pointed out that the concerns about the
unsustainable rate of global resource consumption are reminiscent of
widespread unease in the early 1970s regarding resource exhaustion,
captured most memorably by the Club of Rome in its 1972 publication, The
Limits to Growth.74 John Hille argues that environmental space differs from
“limits to growth” in at least two fundamental respects. First, there is now
a more sophisticated understanding of the potential of technology to
overcome resource limitations—coupled with an awareness and acceptance
of the fact that this potential is itself subject to limitations. Second,
environmental space emphasizes global equity; according to Hille, The
Limits to Growth “skirted the issue of distribution entirely.”75
Equity itself, of course, is subject to different interpretations. The
notion of entitlement to a share of global resources requires some method
whereby such entitlement is to be calculated. The most obvious would be
to allocate environmental space to a country or region based on its
population. Sustainable Europe uses this method, with one significant
modification: after a certain point in time (2010), increases in population
would no longer give rise to an increase in environmental space. As Hille
describes it, “[C]ountries whose population goes on growing after that date
will see their per capita environmental space decreasing, whereas it will
remain constant in countries whose population is constant and increase if
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population declines.”76 Hille notes that this is justified by some notion of
collective responsibility for reproductive behaviour, but points out that
future generations “can neither be held responsible for their place of birth,
nor for the reproductive behaviour of their own or their neighbour’s
parents.”77
A per capita allocation of environmental space does not take into
account historical responsibility for resource depletion.78 This, of course, is
the most obvious difference between this concept and that of ecological
debt, and is arguably the aspect that is most likely to make it more
politically palatable. Despite this advantage, environmental space does not
appear to have had the same resonance as ecological debt, at least not at
the international level. Environmental space figured prominently in a
document produced by the South Centre in 1991, entitled “Environment
and Development: Towards a Common Strategy for the South in the
UNCED Negotiations and Beyond.”79 However, the concept does not appear
to have been taken up by Southern governments or negotiating alliances at
the Earth Summit, or since that time. Even FoE appear to have allowed the
concept to fall from its place of primary importance. Although the FoE
International website includes a reference to environmental space, it is in
the context of its ecological debt campaign.80
B. Environmental Space and Climate Change
Climate change offers a particularly good opportunity to apply the
environmental space concept. The atmosphere is a truly global resource.
Thus, there are few of the difficulties associated with determining whether
the benefits associated with it are to be allocated on a differential basis
from region to region or state to state.81 Similarly, the overall effects of
climate change will be global, although there will undoubtedly be significant
variations in the impacts that will be experienced around the world. The
conceptual underpinnings of the environmental space concept, if not the
actual terminology, have clearly been at issue in academic and non-
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governmental discussions of how to allocate rights in relation to climate
change. This has led to some heated exchanges. One of the best-known
examples was the scathing critique produced by the New Delhi-based
Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) of a World Resources Institute
(WRI) report discussing global responsibility for climate change.82 The WRI
report, having listed the countries with the highest emissions of GHGs,
asserted that “responsibility for greenhouse emissions is spread widely
around the world. Three of the six countries that are the largest
contributors to the atmosphere’s warming potential—the United States, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Brazil, China, India and Japan—have
heavily industrialized economies; three do not.”83 The report goes on to
conclude “Global warming is truly a global phenomenon, in both cause and
potential effect.”84
The CSE responded with a report, the title of which encapsulated its
sense of moral outrage: Global Warming in an Unequal World: A Case of
Environmental Colonialism.85 The authors of the report, Anil Agarwal and
Sunita Narain, took issue with many aspects of the WRI analysis. One
concern centred on the dramatic differences between the historical
contributions of developed and developing countries to the current levels
of GHGs in the atmosphere and the need to see current emission levels in
that context. More importantly, however, the WRI analysis was attacked for
comparing current GHG emissions without distinguishing between “luxury
emissions” and “survival emissions.”86 As Agarwal and Narain asked, “Can
we really equate the carbon dioxide contributions of gas guzzling
automobiles in Europe and North America or, for that matter, anywhere
in the Third World with the methane emissions of draught cattle and rice
fields of subsistence farmers in West Bengal or Thailand?”87 Finally, and
most importantly, the report took issue with the WRI’s premise that a
nation’s potential contribution to climate change can be calculated on the
basis of its emissions. While the WRI report assumed that carbon sinks such
as the oceans and vegetation would simply not be factored into the
equation, Agarwal and Narain insisted that these sinks themselves are
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global resources, to be allocated on a per capita basis.88 Writing about this
exchange later, they noted:
Though apportionment of the carbon dioxide and methane sinks was inherent in the WRI
model, it was not made explicit. When this apportionment was unravelled it was found that
countries which produced larger quantities of CO2 or methane had been given a larger share
of the sinks. CSE questioned these calculations as these sinks are largely global common
property. They should be equitably shared by all human beings on earth. Once this value
assumption was built into the WRI model, the distribution of responsibility for global warming
changed dramatically across the nations of the earth.89 
Agarwal and Narain pointed out that their analysis reflected “[t]he
idea that global environmental space should be equitably shared amongst
all human beings.”90 Their critique reflects the most important aspect of the
concept of environmental space as it has evolved; that to speak of limits,
without speaking of equity, risks perpetuating an international distribution
of resources that is fundamentally skewed in favour of the North.
C. The Story of Making Environmental Space
Like ecological debt, environmental space offers a very different
vision of the goal of international environmental law and policy than “the
level playing field.” It not only labels the existing distribution of resources
as unfair, but it also offers a way of demonstrating that unfairness by
highlighting the significant discrepancy in consumption patterns between
North and South. On the surface, it appears less extreme than ecological
debt, and therefore more acceptable to those accustomed to operating
within the normal parameters of social policy. However, it demands a
similarly comprehensive re-evaluation of those parameters.91 According to
Hille, “[t]o live within our environmental space, we will need both to
radically restructure our economies and to rethink our ways of living, eating
and moving about.”92
Radical restructuring, however, is recognized as a gradual process.
The assumption seems to be that this has to be undertaken in such a way as
to avoid significant social disruption in the North. The point is not to
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impose a set of restrictions that might be perceived as punitive in nature,
but to move steadily towards a different approach to economic prosperity.
In the climate change context, for example, despite the dramatic decrease
in GHG emissions that is required by developed countries, many of the
changes that are contemplated by an environmental space analysis would
not be out of place in any governmental policy document: improving energy
efficiency, encouraging the use of alternative energy sources, or educating
the public about the need for reducing emissions from a range of sources.
This is not a matter of telling people to get out of their cars and onto
bicycles, but of asking them to think carefully about the environmental
impacts of their activities and to make changes where those will be most
effective from both an individual and societal viewpoint.
Thinking about the environment requires changes just as
fundamental as those associated with economic structures. As the term
itself indicates, environmental space requires an attitude of respect and
deference towards natural processes and natural limitations. Precaution
becomes a touchstone of environmental policy. In the climate change
context, of course, this poses a potentially significant challenge to the need
for incrementalism in the economic sphere, since it is estimated that
dramatic reductions in current levels of GHG emissions would be required
in order to avoid anthropogenic interference with the atmosphere.
It is in this sense that environmental space proponents see the need
for leadership by developed countries. Of all the approaches surveyed here,
this approach is the one that is most consistent with that of the UNFCCC and
the Kyoto Protocol itself; it requires countries to take the lead because of
both their historic contributions to GHG concentrations and their current
rate of emissions. Having created the model for unsustainable development,
the North now needs to show that it is possible to pursue an alternative
path that is environmentally sustainable and socially equitable. It should be
noted that this is not a matter of creating and then exporting a new model
of development—since environmental space analysis emphasizes attention
to cultural and ecological diversity—but of showing that alternatives are
actually possible.
The end product of the developed countries “making environmental
space” would be a stable and sustainable international order. Much like the
goal proffered by ecological debt analysis, environmental space analysis
envisages both developed and developing countries converging towards
generally similar ecological footprints. There appears to be an expectation
that consumption may still be lower on a per capita basis in certain
countries and regions, but the premise is that all peoples would enjoy basic
economic, social, and cultural rights: adequate housing, nutrition, health
care, education, and so on. Equity would not be limited to the international
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sphere; it would also apply domestically to ensure that vast discrepancies in
consumption do not occur within nations. Environmental protection would
not be just one factor to be taken into account in policy planning and
implementation. Instead, it would set the parameters within which any and
all policy discussions would take place. This vision is, in its own way, as
idealistic as that of repaying ecological debt, and perhaps even more so,
given that it specifically sets out the fundamental changes in lifestyle that
will be required to achieve it, while ecological debt analysis only hints at
those changes.
V. COMPARING THE STORIES
The three stories surveyed above, and the concepts or approaches
from which they are drawn, represent such different perspectives on the
aims of international environmental law and policy that they may seem to
offer little basis for meaningful comparison. Nevertheless, it is useful to
undertake a comparative analysis, not only to recognize the specific
differences, but also to identify any potential similarities or points of
convergence. The discussion that follows attempts to focus the comparison
by examining three key issues: perceptions of economy and development,
perceptions of the environment, and perceptions of the respective roles of
developed and developing countries in attempting to address and resolve
environmental problems. This is followed by an analysis of the implications
of each of these stories for international environmental law.
A. Economy and Development
Presuppositions regarding economic prosperity and the meaning of
development are inextricably woven into each of the three stories
considered. It is not always easy to identify these assumptions in the story
of the level playing field, since they are largely unarticulated. In the case of
ecological debt and environmental space, on the other hand, the emphasis
on critiquing mainstream thought provides relatively clear insight into what
is perceived as being problematic about current structures, even if it is not
always clear what is proposed as an alternative.
In all of the positions analyzed in the discussion of the U.S.
approach to the Kyoto Protocol, whether that of the U.S. Senate, the
George W. Bush Administration, or the Kerry-Edwards campaign, one sees
a concern about harm to the U.S. economy, the importance of cost-
effectiveness, and the necessity of avoiding any disruption of the status quo.
There is no indication of a willingness to make sacrifices, or to incur short-
term costs in order to ensure long-term economic prosperity. Mainstream
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economic thinking remains the touchstone of debate. On the other extreme,
ecological debt proponents appear to have little faith in mainstream
approaches to economics and environmental protection. If anything, these
approaches are viewed as being largely responsible for the current
economic and environmental problems facing many developing nations;
these nations find themselves subject to the disciplines of international
financial institutions and forced to take the bitter medicine they prescribe
for debt relief. What is proposed as an alternative is not always fully
articulated. However, the focus appears to be on attempting to achieve an
acknowledgment of the gross unfairness of the present rather than on
visualizing an alternative model. The focus in environmental space analysis,
in contrast, is precisely on the need to rethink existing models, formulating
mechanisms by which nations can come to live within appropriate ecological
constraints. While it seems to share the skepticism regarding mainstream
economic thought, it is less sweeping in its condemnation. This may be due
in part to its emergence from the academy, and the perceived need to make
it useful as a tool of policy analysis as well as advocacy.
B. Environment
As with the economy, there are very different perceptions of the
environment embedded in each of these stories. If the economy is ever-
present and its centrality unquestioned in the story of the level playing field,
the environment is almost completely absent. For example, the Byrd-Hagel
Resolution itself mentions environmental protection only in connection
with the exclusion of developing countries, noting that their emissions are
rapidly increasing and that exempting them from the Protocol is
“environmentally flawed.” There is a background assumption that
protection of the environment is important, but it remains abstract; there
is little discussion of the potential effects of climate change, for example,
even if it is recognized as a serious environmental problem. In contrast,
ecological debt analysis makes the damage resulting from environmental
degradation the central focus. Nevertheless, it might also relegate the
environment to the background, since its focus remains resolutely upon the
human costs of environmental problems. The concept of environmental
space appears to be less anthropocentric than either the level playing field
or ecological debt. In a sense, environmental space analysis reverses the
focus on economic harm that characterizes the level playing field; it is
environmental harm rather than economic harm that is to be avoided at all
costs. Like ecological debt analysis, environmental space emphasizes the
need for equity in environmental policy. However, equity is not (and
arguably from this perspective, cannot be) separated from and prioritized
over environmental integrity.
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C. The Role of Developed and Developing Countries
In contrast to perceptions of the economy and environment, the
perceptions about the respective roles of developed and developing
countries in addressing global environmental problems are not difficult to
discern. The U.S. position on this issue appears to be fairly consistent across
the political spectrum. There is an acceptance that developed countries
must take a leadership role in addressing issues such as climate change, but
leadership is conceptualized narrowly in a way that minimizes any
acceptance of responsibility for past or present environmental degradation.
In fact, the U.S. approach appears to require developing countries to accept
responsibility: to recognize the seriousness of the threat of climate change,
and to respond appropriately. The unspoken assumption is that limiting
emissions increases is somehow a less onerous obligation than reducing
existing emissions, in other words, denying developmental aspirations is
more acceptable than requiring sacrifices of current standards of living.
Ecological debt and environmental space, of course, tell very
different stories that dovetail with little difficulty. Ecological debt places the
burden of resolving global environmental problems squarely on the North:
it caused the problems in the past, continues to perpetuate them in the
present, and must address them and compensate those that have suffered
as a result. While ecological debt analysis does not rule out the
responsibility of developing countries, and recognizes the need to avoid a
repetition of predatory and unsustainable patterns of development, its focus
remains resolutely upon developed countries. Environmental space is
somewhat less one-sided, but it allocates the burden in largely the same
way. Developed countries are required to undertake a radical shift in
current consumption levels and to offer the possibility of alternative models
of development that may be of some use to the developing countries in their
attempt to forge their own path to meeting the needs of their populations.
Developing countries must attempt to live within their own environmental
space, which will require a willingness to question and reject many of the
orthodox understandings of development that have held sway in
governmental and elite circles since the time of decolonization.
D. Implications for International Environmental Law
Unlike the perspectives on economy, environment, and the roles of
North and South, there is little in any of the stories examined here about
international environmental law per se, and one therefore has to
extrapolate. 
The U.S. position and the story of the level playing field would lead
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international environmental law in a direction that might not look all that
unfamiliar, but would arguably have normative underpinnings quite
different from those that currently prevail. The United States, after all,
represents one version, albeit the most extreme, of a position that has been
taken by developed countries since the beginnings of international
environmental cooperation. Developing countries are viewed as having to
be led towards a more environmentally friendly and economically efficient
way of organizing their societies, the model for which has already been set
in the North. From this perspective, the role of international environmental
law is a facilitative one: to provide a framework, with minimal interference
and maximum flexibility, for achieving environmental protection through
the operation of the free market and technological innovation. Principles
such as “common but differentiated responsibilities” are denuded of their
normative content and reinterpreted in purely practical terms, with
obligations based on ability to pay. Developed country leadership is
similarly limited in scope. Joyeeta Gupta captured this sentiment in the
climate change context by describing the developed countries’ attitude as
“we will lead as long as you promise to follow soon.”93
The language of ecological debt is in many ways more unfamiliar to
those working in the international environmental law field. As indicated
above, despite some progress that has been made in acknowledging
historical responsibility for environmental degradation, most notably in the
climate change context, international environmental law has been resolutely
forward-facing. It is, in many ways, a pragmatic discipline, which is to a
large degree completely understandable; it seeks to reverse and prevent
environmental degradation across a broad range of sectors, rather than
attempting to assign responsibility for existing damage. It is also all too
familiar with the need for compromise; history can be factored in if
politically necessary, but it is by no means dictated by the internal logic of
the discipline itself.
Of all of the stories examined here, that of making environmental
space most closely corresponds to international environmental law as it has
evolved in the post-UNCED period, with its emphasis on reconciling
environmental protection with development, and balancing the needs of
both present and future generations. However, environmental space
analysis poses a challenge to the leisurely pace of most international efforts
to address both environmental problems and developmental aspirations;
were it to be taken seriously as a conceptual foundation for the field, there
is little doubt that it would challenge the status quo at the most
fundamental level, despite the fact that it appears to be less political than
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ecological debt. Environmental space advocates might recognize the need
for incremental change, but the ultimate goal is a radical shift in public
policy. It is here that it runs counter to prevailing approaches, which
emphasize incrementalism and tinkering at the margins of existing
economic and political paradigms.
Despite the difference between the three stories, there is some
common ground. The United States, despite its insistence on fairness and
equality, does not really want to make all countries shoulder the same
burden for climate change or other global environmental problems. And
the proponents of ecological debt, no matter how devoted to an ideal of
reparation for historical injustices, do not really expect the North to
quantify and pay for the costs of all forms of environmental degradation.
All three stories seek and value some form of fairness; though the concept
is interpreted and deployed in radically different ways, the common
language offers at least some possibility of dialogue. All three strive for an
international order that can operate within ecological constraints, although
the U.S. view appears to regard those constraints as being considerably
more malleable than would be accepted by the others. However, it is
important not to lose sight of the very real differences between these
stories, and the vision of international community that they convey. 
VI. CONCLUSION
A film released in 2004, “The Day After Tomorrow,” presented an
apocalyptic vision of the effects of climate change, with extreme weather
battering large portions of the United States beyond recognition. Turning
the page of a newspaper from an ad for the movie, one could find
photographs of the victims of severe monsoon flooding in South Asia, the
worst in years: women lining up to get food aid, a man carrying a child on
his shoulders while wading through water up to his armpits. These, of
course, are the scenarios that present the real face of climate change,
catastrophic in their own right, if not offering the same kind of Hollywood
drama. In Bangladesh alone, it is estimated that more than 30 million
people were affected by the floods; some lost their crops or homes, others
their lives.94 Economic losses are thought by the Bangladeshi government
have exceeded seven billion dollars.95
How does one respond to a situation like this? The most common
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response is simply to pass it by as yet another example of human misery,
among the countless others that greet us along with our morning coffee.
Others respond with generosity, reaching out to those in need through
charitable donations to Oxfam or UNICEF. How sad, we think, and go on
with our days. But what if it isn’t so easy to distance ourselves from what
happens in Bangladesh? What if we were to become aware that it is our
choices, our lifestyles, that may in fact contribute to the vulnerability of
others to floods in South Asia, or to drought in sub-Saharan Africa, or to
hurricanes in the Caribbean?
In Europe, Canada, and other parts of the developed world, despite
concerns about the costs of implementing the Kyoto Protocol, there is an
awareness of the seriousness of the problem, and at least an emerging sense
of responsibility. It may well be that this is also the case in the United
States. As noted previously, recent polls have indicated that the American
public wants something done about climate change. They expect
government to take action, but may be unclear on what type of action is
required and what the potential impact on their own lives might be. In the
1970s, popular concern about the ozone layer largely drove policy, and U.S.
consumers did their part by rejecting aerosols. But changing deodorants is
a far cry from changing lifestyles, and it is the latter that may be required
if a meaningful response to climate change is to be crafted.
If that is the case, if those in the North really do have to rethink our
ways of living, then the choice of story becomes critical. The level playing
field, whatever its merits, does little to challenge fundamental assumptions
about economy and lifestyle. Yet many would argue that it is precisely what
is required. One can certainly engage in the debate regarding whether to
take action on climate change in economic terms, arguing that the costs
associated with implementation of the Kyoto Protocol targets will be
relatively insignificant, or throwing out some of the figures regarding the
potential costs of adapting to climate change. One could propose a
comparison with the international efforts to address ozone depletion; one
1997 study, for example, calculated that the total costs associated with all
measures to protect the ozone layer were 235 billion dollars (U.S.), while
the benefits associated with those measures, focussing only on reduction of
damage to fisheries, agriculture and materials, were estimated to be
approximately 459 billion dollars, nearly twice that amount.96 
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The stories told by ecological debt and environmental space remind
us that a focus on economic costs risks overshadowing some of the other
costs that need to be factored in as well: ecological costs, evaluated by the
impact on ecosystems that climate change will cause; human costs,
measured by the disruption and dislocation that it will trigger; and moral
costs, which may be the hardest to quantify of all. What are we really saying,
after all, if we say that the economic costs of the Kyoto Protocol are too
high? That the right of some to drive sport utility vehicles is more important
than the right of others to continue to occupy their homes?
The alternative stories considered here ask us to confront these
difficult questions, and to acknowledge that Northern privilege does not
arise in a vacuum. It is not a challenge that is completely without precedent.
On the domestic front, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the developed
nations came to terms with the ecological and human costs of
environmental degradation. They were willing to see these in terms of
obligation. In 1970, for example, then President Richard Nixon proclaimed,
“the 1970s absolutely must be the years when America pays its debt to the
past by reclaiming the purity of its air, its waters, and our living
environment. It is literally now or never.”97 That sense of urgency and
commitment, coming from a somewhat unlikely source, provides a poignant
contrast to the current talk of national self-interest and economic well-
being above all other values. It is particularly ironic that such attitudes
prevail at a time when the United States is asking for the cooperation of the
rest of the international community in combating terrorism. However, there
is a stark difference between cooperation based on power, and cooperation
based on solidarity such as is envisaged by the other stories surveyed here.
The focus in this article has been on the United States, but it is
essential to acknowledge that the official U.S. stance offers an extreme
point along a continuum. Other nations share many of the same views;
some have rejected the Protocol, while others have ratified without a
realistic possibility of meeting their emissions reduction commitments. For
all of them, then—for all of us—listening to a different kind of story might
not merely involve familiarizing ourselves with an alternative approach to
international environmental law and policy. It might just help us to imagine
a different kind of world.
